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PURSUING A CAUSE OF ACTION IN HAZARDOUS WASTE
POLLUTION CASES
INTRODUCTION

Discovery of hazardous waste contamination at the Love Canal
area of Niagara Falls, New York precipitated a nationwide surge of
investigation and publicity about hazardous waste disposal.1 Since
then, thousands of disposal sites have been identified and an ines-2
timable number of hidden and illegal sites are presumed to exist.
1. The first news of the Love Canal contamination printed in the New York Times
appeared on August 2, 1978. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1978, at 1, col. 1. After the first story
was printed, dozens of articles followed, describing the Love Canal situation and publicizing
hazardous waste disposal sites across the country. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1978, at 1,
col. 6; N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1978, § 2, at 14, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1978, at 1, col. 3; id.,
at 18, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1978, at 24, col. 3; id., § 4, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 8,
1978, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1978, § 2, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1978, § 2, at
3, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1979, at 12, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1979, at 12, col. 6; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 6, 1980, § 23, at 18, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 7, 1980, at 23, col. 1.
Many governmental bodies initiated studies of various aspects of hazardous waste pollution. The New York State Department of Health researched pregnancies of women who
lived in the Love Canal area from 1949 to 1976. N.Y. Times, June 24, 1980, § 4, at 16, col. 2.
The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation inventoried the disposal
sites located in New York State on a county by county basis. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1980, at
17, col. 6. The United States Senate Judiciary Committee conducted joint hearings on hazardous waste pollution with the Committee on Labor and Human Resources Subcommittee
on Health and Scientific Research. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1980, at 23, col. 1.
2. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates the number of
hazardous waste disposal sites in the United States to be between 32,254 and 50,664. Of that
number, the number of "significant problem sites" is estimated between 1,204 and 2,027.
[1979] 2 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 2248. These problem sites were mismanaged and now
threaten to cause considerable damage. Id. The EPA estimates that twenty different industries operating 750,000 industrial plants generate 57 million tons of waste annually. N.Y.
Times, June 8, 1980, § 3, at 1, col. 6. Not all manufacturers dispose of hazardous substances
where the EPA can find them. The so-called "midnight dumpers," who secretly dispose of
wastes for a cheaper price than the industry would pay for safer disposal, have created disposal sites along roadsides in North Carolina (see N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1979, at 12, col 6), in
open lots in Kentucky (see N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1979, at 12, col. 1) and in an abandoned
building in New Jersey (see [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 6238, 6255).
Illegal disposal has been termed the "most serious environmental problem of the day."
[1979] 3 CHEM. REG. RaP. (BNA) 1039, reporting a joint EPA, Department of Justice study
of legal means to control illegal disposal. Presently the only tools available to environmental
regulators are "common sense and the common law." Id.
Estimates made by bodies other than the EPA vary. The House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
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Deposited on the sites were a variety of dangerous and toxic chemicals with the continuing potential to cause harm.'
Grave personal injuries and property damage have become associated with exposure to these hazardous wastes, 4 prompting persons who have been exposed to contaminated areas to commence
lawsuits to recover for their injuries. In many cases, however, the
present status of tort law and statutory regulation is ill-equipped
to adjudicate these claims. The nature of hazardous wastes adds
new elements of risk and injury not found in other, more traditional, types of contamination.5 Traditional theories of tort law are
not capable of accurately measuring injury, liability and damages
in nontraditional hazardous waste cases. Current statutory regulation does not benefit those injured by wastes disposed of prior to
the date of enactment.6 It only regulates current disposal. The
problem, therefore, is what recourse exists for plaintiffs injured by
exposure to hazardous wastes.
This Comment will discuss the traditional elements of tort
theory and defenses to liability in tort in light of their applicability
to hazardous waste pollution cases. The viability of the common
law in adjudication of hazardous waste cases will be examined. Judicial and legislative alternatives to existing law will then be proposed and analyzed.
Committee made a limited national survey of hazardous waste. The Subcommittee discovered 53 companies operating 1,605 plants which generated 66 million tons of wastes in 1978.
3 CHEM. REG. REP., supra, at 1312.
3. When the Love Canal landfill was first deemed unsafe, 82 chemicals, of which eleven
were suspected carcinogens, were thought to be on the site. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1978, at 1,
col. 1. As investigation of the landfill progressed, more chemicals were found, increasing the
total number of substances on the site to over 200. 3 CHEm. REG. REP., supra note 2, at 890.
"Hazardous wastes" are defined as substances that can corrode standard materials or are
so toxic they pose substantial danger to human life and environment. EPA Criteria for Identifying Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.3, 261.20-.24 (1980). Not all wastes are "hazardous" but the number of identified hazardous wastes is large and grows regularly. An estimated two million chemical compounds, existed in 1976 and, an estimated 250,000 new
chemicals are created each year. [1976] U.. CODE CONG. & Ai. NEWs 4491, 4493. The EPA
regularly adds new substances to its listing of hazardous substances. See, e.g., [1980] 4
CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 198, where the EPA proposed the addition of eleven substances; id.
at 228, describing five new substances undergoing EPA review; id. at 360, reporting the
EPA's proposed addition of 14 carcinogens to its list of hazardous ,water pollutants; id. at
389, where the EPA added 18 new hazardous substances to its listing of hazardous wastes.
4. See text accompanying notes 12 & 14-24 infra.
5. See note 36 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 27-31 infra.
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I. THE LovE CANAL: BACKGROUND TO A HAZARDOUS WASTE
POLLUTION CASE

A prime example of hazardous waste disposal is the Love
Canal landfill in Niagara Falls, New York. 7 During the 1920's, the
City of Niagara Falls and local chemical companies began using
the abandoned canal as a disposal area for chemical and municipal
wastes.8 Disposal operations continued until 1952 and the land was
sold to the City of Niagara Falls in 1953.1 The site was subsequently developed into a residential area comprised of approximately one hundred homes and an elementary school.10 In 1976,
the New York State Departments of Health and Environmental
Conservation began investigating allegations that chemicals buried
in the landfill had leached through the ground, contaminating residential properties and threatening the health of area residents.11
Two years later, in response to governmental reports, 2 the New
7. The Love Canal area was originally planned to be part of a utopian city. In the late
nineteenth century, William T. Love planned to build a model industrial city near Niagara
Falls, New York. He chose the site because it was near a cheap source of power, Niagara
Falls. Construction of a canal was necessary to connect the upper and lower levels of the
Niagara River, providing access to the power source. Love's plans failed before the canal or
the city were constructed and the area was left deserted for many years. N.Y. STATE DEP'Ts
OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND HEALTH, DEC TECHNICAL REPORT. Toxic SUBSTANCES
IN NEW YORK'S ENVIRONMENT, app. 2 at 2-1 (May 1979) [hereinafter cited as DEC TECHNICAL REPORT]; N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, LOVE CANAL-A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GoVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 3 (September 1978) [hereinafter cited as LoVE CANAL-A SPECIAL REPORT]. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Larry P. Malfitano* in the
selection of this topic.
8. Id. The chemical company most closely associated with the Love Canal disposal operations is the Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation, a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum. HOOKER FACT LINE No. 11, LOVE CANAL: THE FACTS (1892-1980), (June 1980) [hereinafter cited as LOVE CANAL: THE FACTS], states that Hooker began disposal operations in 1942
and acquired title to the canal property on April 28, 1947.
There have also been allegations that the United States Army disposed of hazardous
substances in the Canal. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1978, at 1, col. 1.

9. See LOVE CANAL--A SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 7; LOVE CANAL: THE FACTS, supra
note 8.
10. See DEC TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 7; LOVE CANAL-A SPECIAL REPORT, supra
note 7. The Niagara Falls Board of Education used part of the land to build an elementary
school which was attended by neighborhood children until it was ordered closed on August
2, 1978. Id. at 24.
11. The DEC found evidence of contamination in the Love Canal during the course of
an unrelated investigation it was conducting in the same area. LOVE CANAL--A SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 7.
12. The EPA conducted air sample tests in Love Canal residents' homes. The EPA air
monitors measured chemicals in concentrations 250-5000 times that considered acceptable

536

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

York State Commissioner of Health declared 13the Love Canal a
public nuisance and a danger to public health.
However, the Love Canal is not an isolated example of hazardous waste pollution. Thousands of similar sites exist across the nation, many of which have been in existence for years.14 Only recently, however, have the dangers of exposure to the hazardous
substances contained in these sites become known.
Exposure to hazardous substances takes several forms."5 One
may breathe hazardous substances in the air,"' drink contaminated
water, 17 or eat contaminated food.'" One may come in skin contact
with hazardous substances.19 Unborn children may be exposed to
toxic materials as their mothers are so exposed.2 0 Property damage
can occur after contact with hazardous substances in the form of
gases in the air or liquids in the ground.2
by the EPA. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1978, at 1, col. 1. In some homes, investigators found high
levels of chloroform; benzene; trichloroethylene; toluene; petrochloroethene and 1, 3, 5
trichlorobenzene. The New York State Department of Health conducted an epidemiological
investigation of 100 Love Canal families which measured the risk of the residents' injury
from exposure to the Love Canal contamination. The investigation revealed the rates of
birth defects and miscarriages for some women who lived in the area. Although the statistical sample measured was considered too small to produce conclusive evidence, 4 of 24 children were found mentally retarded and the miscarriage rate was 29.4 percent. Id.
13. See Order of Robert P. Whalen, M.D., Commissioner of Health of the State of New
York, In the Matter of the Love Canal Chemical Waste Landfill Site Located in the City of
Niagara Falls, Niagara County (Aug. 2, 1978), reprinted in LoVE CANALx-A SPEciAL REPORT,

supra note 7.
14. See generally statistics cited note 2 supra. The Love Canal was used as a disposal
site over thirty years ago; other areas were also used for hazardous waste disposal in the
past. In Havertown, Pennsylvania, a wood preservative company disposed of
pentachloraphenal from 1952 onward. The chemical has now entered a nearby stream, killing all life in the stream for approximately 5 miles. [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
6238, 6255. In Pennsville Township, Pennsylvania, chemical wastes disposed of over the past
fifty years are now found to have contaminated local groundwater supplies. Id. In Perham,
Minnesota, arsenic wastes disposed of over thirty years ago presently contaminate local
drinking water supplies. Id. at 6258.
15. See generally DEC TECHMcAL REPORT, supra note 7.
16. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1978, at 1, col. 1, where, after EPA air monitoring, high
concentrations of hazardous chemicals were reported in the basements of some Love Canal
residences.
17. See DEC TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 7-10 and note 23 infra.
18. See DEC TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
19. One Love Canal resident claimed that his childhood exposure by swimming in a
contaminated pond caused him to contract Hodgkin's disease later in life. N.Y. Times, Aug.
2, 1978, § 2, at 9, col. 3. See also DEC TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 7, at app. 6.
20.

See DEC TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 4 and note 24 infra.

21. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1978, at 1, col. 1, where one Love Canal homeowner de-
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Some toxic chemicals are known carcinogens, mutagens and
teratogens.22 High incidents of childhood leukemia and kidney
damage have been associated with exposure to aceton, benzene and
trichloroethylene (TCE).2 Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are
potent carcinogens; TCE attacks the central nervous system causing headaches, tremors and convulsions; dioxin causes liver damage, ulcers and birth defects.2 Some chemicals may cause health
damage but the proof is not conclusive. Kepone may cause brain
damage and other nervous system disorders; vinyl chloride, arsenic
and asbestos may be carcinogens.2 5 The National Cancer Institute
estimates that between 60 and 90 percent of the cancer suffered by
United States citizens is caused by environmental contaminants. 6
The variety and severity of potential damage from hazardous
waste contamination combined with the large amounts of contaminants buried in this country produce vast numbers of persons who
have incurred injury after exposure to hazardous substances. These
injured persons are now turning to the law, seeking compensation
for their injuries.
No statutory scheme exists to compensate the injured or aid in
the resolution of hazardous waste cases. Certain federal environmental protection statutes regulate current hazardous waste disposal 27 and federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulascribed the destruction of vegetation on her property over a period of years.
22. DEC TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 4. Carcinogens are cancer-causing agents;
mutagens cause gene mutations resulting in heredity changes; teratogens cause birth defects.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATiONAL DICTIONARY (1976).
23. Several New Jersey residents testified before the United States Senate Judiciary
Committee regarding correlation of the high incidence of these diseases and the residents'
exposure to drinking water polluted with these chemicals. One man described the recent
death of his infant daughter from kidney disease presumed to have been caused by exposure
to the chemicals. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1980, at 23, col. 1.
24. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1980, § 3, at 1, col 6. Dioxin has been identified as one of the
chemicals buried on the Love Canal site. [1979] 3 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 890. In 1978, the
New York State Department of Health studied the pregnancies of Love Canal residents over
the period 1949-1976. See N.Y. Times, June 24, 1980, § 4, at 16, col 2. The results of the
study, released on June 23, 1980, showed unusual numbers of birth defects and miscarriages
plus overall reduced infant birth weight in children born between 1958 and 1964. Id.
25. [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 4491, 4494.
26. Id.
27. The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979),
regulates the manufacture and introduction of new chemical substances in the market place.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976 & Supp. m3T
1979), regulates the disposal of hazardous wastes. Neither act may be applied retroactively
to disposal such as that at the Love Canal.
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tions enacted in 1980 are designed to provide "cradle to grave"
control over the production, transportation and disposal of hazardous substances.2 8 A "superfund" was created in 1980 to pay the
cost of cleaning up hazardous waste contamination. 29 However,
none of these provisions affords the private individual any remedy
for injury caused by exposure to hazardous waste contamination, 0
nor do any of these provisions apply to waste disposal that occurred before their enactment.3 1 Consequently, injured persons

have no direct recourse through existing statutory or regulatory
provisions.
1.

THE COMMON LAW APPLIED TO HAZARDOUS WASTE
POLLUTION CASES

-

In the absence of statutory remedies, an injured party may
bring suit under common law tort theories which historically have
been used to preserve the environment.3 2 Successful lawsuits
28. The new regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-65 (1980), became effective on November 19,
1980. The EPA is empowered to impose penalties against violators of the regulations. 42
U.S.C. § 6928 (1976 & Supp. 1m 1979).
29. A bill creating the Superfund was passed by the 96th Congress on November 24,
1980. 126 CONG. REC. S14,930, S15,009 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). See text accompanying
notes 117-23 infra.
30. See text accompanying notes 117-23 infra.
31. For example, disposal operations at the Love Canal ended in 1952, more than 20
years before the effective date of either the Toxic Substances Control Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
2601-29 (1976 & Supp. I 1979), or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-87 (1976 & Supp. El 1979). Therefore, neither statute applies to the Love Canal
situation.
Regulations are also ineffective against the "midnight dumpers," see note 2 supra. Because of the clandestine nature. of their activities, it is very difficult to apprehend persons
who illegally dispose of hazardous wastes and equally difficult to accurately estimate the
precise types or amounts of substances disposed of.
32. For a general discussion of the uses of common law tort theories in environmental
cases, see Coquillette, Mosses from the Old Manse: Another Look at Some HistoricProperty Cases About the Environment, 64 CoRNsnI L. REv. 761 (1979); Juergensmeyer, Common Law Remedies and Protectionof the Environment, 6 U.B.C. L. REv. 215 (1971); Wade,
Environmental Protection,the Common Law of Nuisance and the Restatement of Torts, 8
FORUM 165 (1972); Comment, InternalizingExternalities:Nuisance Law and Economic Efficiency, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 219 (1978). Litigation has been called "the biggest single plus
factor... in environmental preservation." Oakes, Environmental Litigation: Current Developments and Suggestions for the Future,5 CONN. L. REv. 531, 552 (1973). One commentator has noted that common law actions are a viable remedy within the framework of modem statutory environmental regulation. Maloney, Judicial Protectionof the Environment:
A New Role for Common-Law Remedies, 25 VAm. L. Rhv. 145 (1972), describes a revival of
common law actions precipitated by what he calls a legislative failure to successfully provide
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abated environmental hazards,"3 and provided compensation for
the discomfort and damage resulting from traditional pollutants
such as smokestack emissions" and industrial rubbish. s However,
adequate remedies for environmental damage.
The common law tort theories most often used in traditional pollution litigation include
trespais, strict liability, negligence and nuisance. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86,
342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960), was a trespass action. Plaintiffs successfully sought an injunction against defendant aluminum manufacturer's emission of airborne gases and particulate matter that contaminated plaintiff's property. Plaintiff, a cattle
rancher, claimed that defendant's pollution poisoned water and grazing materials on his
land, rendering it unfit for raising livestock. Similarly, in Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y.
328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954), plaintiff sought damages in trespass for contamination of his
water supply by underground seepage of gasoline stored on defendant's property. The court,
however, held that plaintiff did not make out a case in trespass and denied relief.
In Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 368 N.E.2d 24, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401
(1977), plaintiffs sought damages on negligence and strict liability grounds. Alleging injury
from the defendants' hydraulic dredging, plaintiffs argued that the defendants should be
held strictly liable for the consequences of the dredging. Plaintiffs had been awarded verdicts by the jury which were set aside by the Supreme Court and reinstated by the Appellate Division. After an exposition of the application of strict liability and negligence theories
in New York, the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial on the ground that the
issues of defendants' negligence and strict liability were not fully resolved below.
Nuisance encompasses a wide range of conduct and has developed into a flexible and
adaptable, although somewhat confusing body of law. See Wade, supra. Compare Copart
Indus., Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 362 N.E.2d 968, 394 N.Y.S.2d
169 (1977) with McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 80 N.E. 549 (1907).
McCarty, infra note 34, was a successful nuisance action seeking an injunction against a coal
factory. The plaintiff in Copart alleged negligence and the existence of a nuisance in this
action to recover damages caused by industrial particulate emissions. The Court held that
plaintiff's claims were properly dismissed below and denied relief.
Nuisance results from an invasion of property rights by conduct that is intentional, negligent or abnormally dangerous. Nuisance law balances the utility of the conduct against the
gravity of the harm caused by the conduct. The balancing performed by courts deciding
nuisance cases has resulted in the elastic body of law that is nuisance. The flexibility of
nuisance theory has prompted commentators to pronounce nuisance the most effective
common law cause of action in pollution cases. See, e.g., Comment, supra, at 219 & 240;
Maloney, supra, at 162 and Wade, supra, at 172-74.
For a discussion of the historical background of nuisance law, see Copart Indus., Inc.,
supra; W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 86 (4th ed. 1971); Coquillette, supra.
33. Many lawsuits sought to enjoin the activity causing the pollution. Maloney, supra
note 32, at 147. In Win. Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611), plaintiff landowner
successfully sued to restrain a neighbor from fouling the air with odors from his pig sty. In
Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913), plaintiff, a riparian
landowner, sued to prevent a pulp mill from discharging solid and liquid wastes into the
stream running by plaintiff's land. The Court granted the injunction which had the effect of
closing the mill, an operation worth $1 million, employing 400-500 people.
34. In McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907), plaintiff
brought an action to enjoin a neighboring factory from burning soft coal which caused black
smoke, soot and dust to settle on surrounding homes. The Court granted the injunction,
forbidding the defendant to burn soft coal until such time as it could be done without pro-
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traditional tort law will present plaintiffs with many barriers to
successful litigation of hazardous waste claims, including problems
of causation, proof, and defenses to liability, all of which are rooted
in the unique nature of the pollution itself.
Hazardous wastes exhibit characteristics that distinguish them
from traditional pollution. 8 Traditional pollutants are few in number, either visible or apparent to the senses, and produce effects
that are readily ascertainable upon exposure. 7 In contrast to traditional pollutants, hazardous wastes are characterized by the large
number of known and potential pollutants, 8 their potential for
causing catastrophic harm,39 and the long latency period between
the time of exposure and manifestation of any injury. 40 Tort law
that has evolved around traditional pollution cases 41 will be unresponsive and must be adapted to the nontraditional nature of
hazardous waste pollution cases.
A.

Establishing Causation

Causation, one of the essential elements of a common law tort
action, is difficult .to establish because of the nature of hazardous
waste claims. Under traditional notions of causation, the defendant's conduct must be the actual and legal cause of the plaintiff's
ducing injury or damage.
35. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
36. Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207
(1978), includes hazardous wastes in the class of "environmental risks." Environmental risks
also include nuclear wastes, recombinant DNA and ozone depletion by fluorocarbon emissions. Page maintains that environmental risks are a relatively new phenomenon not adequately recognized by environmental regulators nor subject to effective regulation by traditional means. Page cites seven characteristics which define environmental risk, including 1)
limited knowledge of the creation and effects of environmental hazards, 2) the great potential for catastrophic harm, 3) relatively limited benefit from environmental risk-producing
activities when compared with the possible extreme consequences of the activities, 4) low
probability of catastrophic outcome, 5) ineffective internal market transfer of benefits and
costs of environmental risks, 6) latency period between the exposure to an environmental
risk and manifestation of the effects of exposure, and 7) irreversibility of the effects of environmental risk pollution. These factors cause environmentalists to question the abilty of
existing institutions to regulate and manage environmental risks. Id.
37. Id.
38. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
39. See text accompanying notes 14-26 supra.
40. See text accompanying notes 7-13 supra for a description of the latency period between the time chemicals were buried at the Love Canal and the time injuries were discovered by Love Canal residents.
41. See note 32 supra.
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injury.' 2 In traditional pollution cases, the cause of the harm and
the defendant's role in creating it are readily identifiable. 43s The
nature of hazardous waste cases, however, presents problems in detecting the harm and establishing the defendant's responsibility.
First, a long latency period during which the injury is not apparent, is typical in hazardous waste pollution cases.4 ' During this
period the harmful effects of exposure to hazardous substances
may be compounded by continued exposure or intervening factors,
such as exposure to carcinogens in the workplace. Because the injury is not manifested until after the passage of time the actual
cause of the harm may be disguised or altered, thereby making it
45
difficult to establish the defendant's liability.

Second, more than one party may have contributed to the disposal of hazardous substances in a particular area.46 Even if a
plaintiff suffered only one exposure, it may be impossible to ascertain which party was responsible for depositing the injury-causing
substance on the disposal site.47 This problem is compounded by
the fact that in many cases it is difficult to determine which substance or substances caused the injury.

Third, individuals may be exposed to more than one hazardous substance simultaneously. Several different substances may lie
at a single exposure point' 8 or an individual may be exposed to one
42. W. PROSSER, supra note 32, at § 41; see also Malone, Ruminations on Cause in
Fact, PERSPECTIVE ON TORT LAW (R. Rabin ed. 1976). An issue in hazardous waste cases,
particularly the Love Canal case, will be the extent to which waste disposers could have
forseen the severity and magnitude of damage their actions have caused. For the New York
standard of f6reseeability in causation questions, see Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Special thanks to El6na K. Herald for the development
and completion of this section and the Comment as a whole.
43. For example, in McCarty, black soot and smoke were deposited on plaintiff's property. The cause of the deposit was easily traced to a nearby factory smokestack, that was
owned and operated by the defendant.
44. Page, supra note 36.
45. In the Love Canal case, the issue of intervening causes is important. During the
period the Canal was filled with wastes, the area was deserted. After disposal operations
ceased, extensive construction was undertaken in the area. The upheaval associated with
massive construction may be found to have contributed to the movement of chemicals buried on the site. See LovE CANAL: THE FACTS, supra note 8.
46. See text accompanying notes 7 & 8 supra.
47. Accurate records tracking disposal activities over long periods of time were not
ususally kept. Records that exist remain in the possession of the parties who are responsible
for the disposal and who are reluctant to share the data with outside interests. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 12, 1979, § 2, at 2, col. 5.
48. For example, over 200 different chemical compounds have been identified in the
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or more substances at several exposure points during the same period.4 9 Subsequent injuries may result from one of these exposures
or from the cumulative effects of multiple exposures.5 0 Determining which of these exposures is the actual cause of the injury and
who should be held responsible may not be possible under these
circumstances.
Under the existing common law, if both elements of proximate
cause cannot be established, the cause of action will fail. Because
many persons injured by hazardous waste contamination will not
be able to identify the proximate cause of their injury in the traditional sense, they face dismissal of their cause of action. Adjusting
the requirement of establishing proximate cause will prevent plaintiffs from being denied a remedy for their injury.5 1
B. Proving Causation
Plaintiffs injured by exposure to hazardous waste pollution
may not be able to prove causation even if the proximate cause of
the alleged injury is identifiable.52 Potential evidence is lost and
witnesses forget facts during the latency period. Records identifying substances on the exposure site may be inadequate or nonexistent.5 s Data that would be most helpful to the plaintiff is usually
54
controlled by the polluter and is difficult for a plaintiff to obtain.
Love Canal disposal site. [1979] 3 CHEm. REG. REP. (BNA) 890.
49. Many Love Canal residents fit these facts. Chemical manufacturing is a major in-

dustry in Niagara Falls with nine companies in Niagara County employing 5,267 people,
Many individuals employed by a chemical company to routinely handle hazardous wastes
also live near a disposal site. LovE CANAL-A SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 4 (quoting
1970 data compiled by the New York State Department of Commerce).

50.

[T]he interaction of chemical substances in some cases, makes these dangers

multiplicative rather than additive ....

[A]sbestos workers who are non-smok-

ers do not have an appreciably higher lung cancer rate than the population at
large. However ....

if an asbestos worker smokes, his chances of getting lung

cancer are eight times greater than the average cigarette smoker and are 92
times greater than an individual who is neither in asbestos worker or smoker.
Thus, the risks appear to be multiplied by these interactions.

[1976] U.S.
51.

CODE

CONG. & AD. NEws 4491, 4494.

See note 120 infra.

52. For example, a Love Canal resident who has no other history of exposure to hazardous wastes yet suffers an injury associated with hazardous wastes may reasonably conclude
that his exposure to substances escaping from the Canal is the cause of his injury.
53.

See note 47 supra.

54. See Maloney, supra note 32, at 155. This is not a problem exclusive to hazardous
waste cases and plaintiffs who have commenced an action have recourse through discovery
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Without specific information, plaintiffs must rely on statistical
data and expert testimony to show correlation between exposure to
a hazardous substance and resulting injury. In some cases, however, science is unsure of the precise effects of certain chemicals. 55
Disagreement among researchers and unmatured investigation
combine to create uncertainty as to the cause of individual injuries.
Test results are often reported in inconclusive terms or conclusions
are insufficient to show causation. 56 Consequently, when the plaintiff's injury is manifested at the end of the latency period, available
proof of causation is inadequate. Although more conclusive evidence may have been available at the time of exposure, an injured
person cannot be expected to recognize his need to gather evidence
until his injury becomes apparent. That plaintiff, although perhaps
unable to establish and prove the cause under traditional standards, is certain of one thing: he or she has suffered serious damage. Theoretically, tort law will provide compensation for such
damage; but its structure must be modified to allow recovery in
nontraditional hazardous waste cases. To remedy the inequities inherent in a system that denies recovery to a large number of plaintiffs with serious injury, lawmakers have proposed adjusting the
standards of establishing and proving causation in hazardous waste
cases. 57

C. PotentialDefenses to Liability
A plaintiff who overcomes the barriers of establishing and
proving causation will face defenses to liability such as statute of
limitations, reasonableness of disposal operations and assumption
of risk. Under the traditional common law, these defenses protect
unwary defendants from unwarranted liability. In hazardous waste
cases, however, these defenses may shield the culpable defendant
from liability, precluding the unwary plaintiff from warranted
recovery.
proceedings. However, even the U.S. Department of Justice encountered lengthy delays and
resistance in its attempts to acquire data. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1979, § 2, at 2, col. 5.
55. See text accompanying notes 25 & 26 supra.
56. N.Y. Times, June 24, 1980, § 4, at 16, col. 2, reports that a New York State Health
Department report (supranote 24) was immediately criticized as statistically unsound. The
report itself contains a disclaimer of any finding of a cause and effect relationship between

the hazardous substances and injuries analyzed therein. Id.
57.

See note 120 infra.
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The statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action
accrues; that is, when an invasion of an individual's legally protected right occurs, producing an injury.55 Liability for the injury
arises, and the limitations period begins to run, regardless of the
fact that the plaintiff may be unaware of the injury." In the absence of fraud or an express statutory provision that provides for
the tolling of the statute of limitations, 0 traditional policy considerations dictate rigid enforcement of the statute of limitations to
protect the unwary defendant against stale or false claims.61 These
traditional rules accomodate the relative interests presented by
traditional cases. In hazardous waste pollution cases, however, the
statute of limitations works to bar many valid claims from
adjudication.
Under the traditional statute of limitations rules, the cause of
action accrues at the time an individual is exposed to a hazardous
substance. However, typical injuries from hazardous waste contamination do not manifest themselves until after the passage of considerable time.6 2 An individual may remember being exposed to
hazardous pollutants, but be unaware of or unable to identify the
possible correlation between exposure and injury. 63 When the la58. Schmidt v. Merchant Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
59. In New York, a cause of action accrues upon injury, notwithstanding the injured
party's knowledge of the injury. 270 N.Y. at 300, 200 N.E. at 827. The courts in both
Schmidt and Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142,
237 N.Y.S.2d 714, modified on other grounds, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1963),
barred the claims before them on statute of limitations grounds, despite the fact that both
plaintiffs presented valid claims. In Schwartz, plaintiff alleged that the injection he received
in 1944 of a substance used to make his sinuses sensitive to X-rays caused his eye cancer
discovered in 1957. Although Schwartz commenced the action in 1959 and the court recognized the hardship the plaintiff would suffer if his claim was dismissed, the court refused to
extend the period of limitations to allow plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff's injury was held to have
occurred at the time he received the injection, not at the time he developed cancer. 12
N.Y.2d at 217, 188 N.E.2d at 144, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
60. In Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1977) and
General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125, 219 N.E.2d 169, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1966),
the defendant fraudulently concealed a cause of action from the plaintiff. The court in each
case held the statute of limitations tolled during the time the defendant acted fraudulently.
61. 12 N.Y.2d at 218, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
62. See text accompanying notes 7-13 & note 36 supra.
63. Not only do people forget precise instances of exposure that may have occurred in
their past, it is also difficult to identify the substances to which one was actually exposed.
See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra. "One of the problems with Love Canal is that no
one is really sure what is showing up." N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1978, § 2, at 1, col. 3 (quoting
Peter A. A. Berle, New York State Commissioner of Environmental Conservation).
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tency period intervenes between exposure and manifestation of injury, the limitations period often expires before the individual discovers or identifies his injury, barring him from seeking. judicial
relief for the injury.
Given the nontraditional aspects of hazardous waste pollution,
the traditional policy considerations justifying strict application of

statutes of limitations are no longer viable." Rather than providing protection for unsuspecting defendants"' against invalid claims,

the statute now prevents the hearing of valid claims of unsuspecting plaintiffs. Where once a few valid claims were barred to prevent a flood of invalid ones, now the ratio is reversed so that a

large number of valid claims may be dismissed. In short, many persons, particularly those exposed to hazardous wastes in the past,

pursuing claims for bona fide injuries, face dismissal of those
claims on statute of limitations grounds without consideration of

the merits.6 6 Legislative amendment of the statute of limitations
would remedy the inequities produced by the application of a trad-

tional statutory period to nontraditional pollution cases.
Aside from asserting a statute of limitations defense, one may
successfully defend a tort action if his conduct is judged reasonable

under the circumstances existing at the time and place the conduct
64. DEC TECHmcAL REPORT, supra note 7, at app. 8 at 8-10.
65. The question arises as to how "unwary" a defendant chemical company is in hazardous waste cases. Consider that it is the chemical companies who create, manufacture and
dispose of hazardous substances for profit and possess expert knowledge of the substances.
For example, Hooker Chemical and Plastics Company may have had knowledge of the effects of its disposal in the Love Canal when it sold the land in 1953. The deed transferred in
the sale contained a clause releasing Hooker from claims involving chemicals deposited in
the landfill. [1979] 9 ENvns. REP. (BNA) 2293. Moreover, documents obtained by the U.S.
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation indicate that
Hooker knew chemicals were seeping from the Canal in 1958 and in 1971. Hooker expressed
concern over water pollution in the immediate area which was possibly the result of leaching
chemical contamination. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1979, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
66. Partial consideration of hazardous waste claims is possible in cases like the Love
Canal where chemicals are currently leaching from the original disposal site to neighboring
property. As the chemicals migrate, they produce recurring invasions of Love Canal residents' property. New York allows an action in continuing trespass in cases of recurring
invasions. See 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 15 N.Y.2d 48, 203
N.E.2d 486, 255 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1964). Continuing trespass gives rise to successive causes of
action, each of which accrues at the moment of invasion, rather than at the time the disposal occurred. However, although causes of action in continuing trespass accruing within the
statute of limitations would not be barred, plaintiffs' recovery would be limited to damages
accruing within the limitations period. Causes of action for invasions occurring prior to the
limitations period would continue to be barred.
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occurred. e7 In determining the reasonableness of the conduct, the
courts balance the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the
utility of the defendant's conduct.6 8 No rigid standard is used as a
guide; rather, the facts of each case determine the reasonableness
issue.' The reasonableness of the defendant's conduct was at issue
in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 70 In Boomer, plaintiffs alleged

that particular emissions from the defendant's cement plant constituted a nuisance.71 The Court compared the utility of the plant's
operation in the area against the esthetic and monetary damage
caused by the plant's emissions. The Court held the defendant
could remain in operation if it compensated the plaintiffs for their
injuries. 2
In contrast to classical pollution cases like Boomer,7 nontraditonal pollution cases do not lend themselves to a neat balancing process. The damage caused by the pollution of a stream by
sewage or garbage disposal is apparent to the senses soon after the
disposal occurs. The damage can be directly attributed to the defendant. A court can then compare the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's injury and determine damages under existing technological, social and legal standards. However, the latency period
inherent in nontraditional pollution cases creates a wide gap in
time between the point of exposure to the chemical pollutant and
the manifestation of the resulting injury. What may have been a
67. McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 46-47, 81 N.E. 549, 550 (1907).
68. For a discussion of the issues relevant to the balancing process, see Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
69. 189 N.Y. at 46, 81 N.E. at 550.
70. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312.
71. Id. at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314. Plaintiffs were owners of property adjoining that of defendant cement manufacturer. Plaintiffs claimed that the "dirt,
smoke and vibration emanating from the plant" caused injury and damage to their property.
Id.
72. Id. at 228, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319. Boomer marked a departure
from traditional nuisance remedy. Prior to Boome the remedy for nuisance was an injunction against the conduct at issue. The Boomer court did not grant an injunction but
awarded damages instead.
73. Boomer is an example of a traditional pollution case brought under nuisance law.
Plaintiffs were injured and brought suit within the limitations period while the plant was in
operation. The invasion of plaintiffs' property rights was visible soon after it occurred and
the resulting damage was easily ascertainable ("Cement plants are obvious sources of air
pollution in the neighborhoods where they operate."). Id. at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309
N.Y.S.2d at 314. The Court was able to ascertain the cause of the injury and then compare
the competing interests of the parties, untainted by the effects of the passage of time.
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reasonable act at the time it was committed may produce unreasonable consequences in the future.7 4 When the court compares the
defendant's conduct with the plaintiff's injury, it must balance not
only the differing claims of the parties present, 75 but also the conflicting technological achievements, social mores and legal theories
of separate time periods. Traditional balancing compares the parties' actions in a single time frame, but without recognition of the
long term effects associated with hazardous waste pollution, tradi-

tional balancing does not allow a complete comparison of harm
and utility.

Moreover, reasonableness is a nebulous, shifting standard.76
Although traditional cases abound, 7 there are few, if any, nontraditional cases to guide the parties in hazardous waste litigation. If traditional precedents are applied to hazardous waste
cases, the result will be the application of the traditional concepts

of reasonableness to a nontraditional problem. What is required,
on the contrary, is the shaping of new standards which take into

account the nontraditional aspects of hazardous waste cases.
In addition to the statute of limitations and reasonable conduct defenses, a plaintiff's conduct may be considered in appor-

tioning liability in tort.7 9 A plaintiff may be denied recovery in tort
if, by his conduct, he has assumed the risk of injury.8 0 In Bove v.
Donner-Hanna Coke Corp.,8 1 for example, plaintiff alleged that a
coke-manufacturing plant located across the street from her home
74. Witness the conflicting interests present in the Love Canal case. Those who buried
wastes in the Canal claim they exercised all the care the state of the art provided. Lovx
CANAL-THE FACTS, supra note 8. However, the Love Canal residents claim that the effects
of those wastes now cause the residents unreasonable injuries.
75. In the Love Canal case the disposal site owner's right to put chemicals in the Canal
existed in the past. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra. The right of current residents to
enjoy their property exists in the present The rights of current residents' descendants to
normal healthy lives exists in the future.
76. "No hard and fast rule controls the subject, for a use that is reasonable under one
set of facts would be unreasonable under another." McCarty, 189 N.Y. at 46, 81 N.E. at 550.
77. See, e.g., Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 362
N.E.2d 968, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1977); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 219,
257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y.
40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907); Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun. 565, 2 N.Y.S. 289 (1888); Bove v.
Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (4th Dep't 1932).
78. In New York, the Love Canal case is one of first impression.
79. W. PROSSER, supra note 32, at 612.
80. See 236 A.D. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229.
81. Id.
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desposited soot and fumes on her property. Even though the plant
was not built when the plaintiff moved into the neighborhood, the
court held that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury by moving
into a neighborhood of general industrial character. The court
found defendant's construction of a coke plant in an industrial
area to be reasonable and held that the plaintiff should have anticipated the possibility of future annoyance because of the general
2
industrial character of the neighborhood.

The plaintiff's conduct is not an absolute defense, however;
rather, plaintiff is only required to act reasonably under the circumstances.83 For example, in Campbell v. Seaman,8 4 the New
York Court of Appeals held that a property owner's rights were not
defeated by his neighbor's unreasonable land use even though the
neighbor had engaged in the activities prior to the time the plaintiff property owner came to the area.8 5 In Campbell, plaintiffs acquired property adjoining defendant's brickyard without knowledge of the use defendant made of his property.86 Over a period of
years, plaintiffs built a home and extensively landscaped the area
with "trees and shrubs, both ornamental and useful.

' 87

Plaintiffs

alleged that gaseous emissions from defendant's brick manufacturing operation settled on plaintiffs' trees and shrubs, killing the vegetation. 8 Although defendant had maintained his brickyard prior
to the time plaintiffs purchased their property, the court nevertheless held the defendant liable for his actions.8 9 To do otherwise,
reasoned the court, would allow the defendant to control future
use of property adjoining the brickyardYe
82. Id.
83. W. PROSSER, supra note 32, at 611.
84. 63 N.Y. 568 (1876).

85. Id. at 584. Defendant brick manufacturer was held liable for damage his industry
caused to trees and shrubbery on plaintiff's property. Defendant's liability was not affected
by the fact that his business was in operation before plaintiff located nearby. The Court
reasoned that to allow the nuisance would be tantamount to allowing the defendant to control plaintiff's land use. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 576.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 577.
90. Id. at 584:
One cannot place upon his land anything which the law would pronounce a nuisance, and thus compel his neighbor to leave his land vacant, or to use it in such
way only as the neighboring nuisance will allow.
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A decisive question in hazardous waste pollution cases will be
whether injured persons reasonably assumed the risk of injury
when they were exposed to toxic substances. The Love Canal case
illustrates the problems in applying the traditional reasonableness
standard to hazardous waste, cases. Assumption of risk requires
some knowledge of the potential for harm; therefore, it must be
asked whether people who bought homes on the Canal knew chemicals had been buried on the site and, if so, whether they knew the
possible harmful effects of those chemicals.9 1 Under Bove, the defendant's land use in an uninhabited area might be held reasonable, or plaintiffs might be charged with knowing what the land had
been used for, thus defeating their claim for damages. However,
serious doubts can be raised as to the actual knowledge of Love
Canal homeowners.9 2 It is probable that any risk the residents arguably assumed was not apparent. The substances now allegedly
causing harm were hidden underground on neighboring land and
the exact nature of the substances was, and remains, unknown.93
Under Campbell, a landowner who lacks knowledge of previous unreasonable use of property may be held to have acted reasonably in
purchasing his land, thus defeating the assumption of risk defense.
Given the dearth of accurate information regarding the location
and effects of the substances buried in the Love Canal, it is arguable that the residents should not be held to have had sufficient
knowledge to establish the assumption of risk defense.
Moreover, under the reasoning of Campbell, past conduct by a
disposer should not be sanctioned if it will control future use of the
land. If a homeowner is injured because he cannot reside in a home
which registers unacceptable levels of contamination and if he
cannot recover damages for his injury, his property use has been
curtailed by someone else's conduct with no compensation to the
homeowner. This result is unacceptable. However, if the homeowner cannot surmount the common law barriers to proving his
cause of action, the unacceptable result will prevail.
91. Until this and other fact questions disputed by the parties are tried, we can only
speculate as to the answers.
92. If the parties who buried wastes in the Canal prevail in their contention (see N.Y.
Times, Apr. 11, 1979, § 2, at 1, col. 9) that they did not know of the hazards inherent in
their disposal of toxic chemicals, the homeowners may also justly claim a lack of knowledge
regarding the risks of living near the Canal.
93. See text accompanying notes 7-13 supra.
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CREATION OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL TORT

In light of the numerous obstacles blocking litigation of hazardous waste pollution cases, there has been movement to enact
legislation to insure plaintiffs in nontraditional hazardous waste
litigation an opportunity to be heard. Changes have been proposed
or made on the issues of statute of limitations,9 establishing"5 and
proving9" proximate cause. Lawmakers have introduced proposals
to lengthen the applicable statute of limitations and to permit the
accrual of a cause of action upon an individual's discovery of his
injury rather than at the time the individual is exposed to a hazardous substance.9 7 Commentators have advocated the extension of
the doctrine of strict liability to hazardous waste activities, eliminating the necessity of plaintiffs establishing and proving causation.' In the alternative, lessening the burden of proof requirements in hazardous waste litigation has also been considered.

Changes in existing law may be achieved by judicial or legislative action. Judicial resolution of pollution claims is advantageous
because litigation provides more individualized relief than legislation can offer." The elasticity of the common law allows courts a
94. New York State has considered enacting a new statute of limitations in hazardous
waste cases. The new statute would extend the time for commencing an action for a period
after the discovery of injury. See N.Y. Times, June 8, 1980, at 38, col. 1. New York courts
have been reluctant to allow the limitations period to run from the discovery of the injury.
See notes 59 & 60 supra. The legislature has modified the statute of limitations only in the
most compelling cases. For a discussion of the application of the discovery rule in medical
malpractice cases, see Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and
Other Jurisdictions,47 CoRNuL L.Q. 339 (1962) and Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp.,
24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
Congressional legislation has been proposed which would extend the statute of limitations on the federal level. See note 121 infra.
95. Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of Hazardous
Wastes, 64 MINN. L. Rav. 949 (1980). See also note 119 infra.
96. See note 120 infra.
97. See note 94 supra.
98. See Note, supra note 95.
99. Legislation is a slow process and grants broad forms of relief. It is not able to consider and provide for each individual case. See generally Pedrick, Does Tort Law Have a
Future?, 39 Omo ST. L.J. 782 (1978); Oakes, supra note 32; Wade, supra note 32; Comment,
supra note 32. Litigation does not allow the weighing of the harm caused to all persons who
have been injured, however. Litigation provides a forum only for those who pursue it. Oakes,
supra note 32. See also Murphy, The Future of the Law for Energy and the Environment,
39 OHio ST. L.J. 752 (1978), who contends that legislatures have not responded to environmental problems with effective leadership.
In many instances, environmental lawsuits have provided the courts an opportunity to
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measure of flexibility in applying legal rules and determining appropriate remedies. 10 0 Although courts can, and in some jurisdictions have, adapted existing common law to modern pollution
cases, 101 commentators have recognized the inability of the common law to respond with vigor to nontraditional environmental
02
problems.
That inability is the result of several factors, one of which is
the slow pace at which the law evolves.10 3 The common law is a
flexible entity whose composition is determined in light of society's
needs and demands. When the nature of society changes, new law
express and implement policy considerations that extend beyond the individual case before
the court. For example, in Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805
(1913), the New York Court of Appeals established the rule that an injunction would issue
in a pollution case where the damage to the plaintiff was not insubstantial, regardless of the
relative loss to the defendant. The Court justified its action on policy grounds, taking a long
term view of the potential harm the defendant's pollution would cause. The Whalen rule
was later discussed in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 224, 257 N.E.2d
870, 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (1970), where the Court also considered the potential harm
to the community if an injunction was issued. The Boomer court awarded damages to the
plaintiffs but denied the injunction. See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
100. Comment, supra note 32, at 240.
101. Maloney, supra note 32, discusses the common law as a viable means of combatting environmental hazards. For a general discussion of precedent for judicial recognition of
a new tort, see King, The Tort of Unconscionability: A New Tort for New Times, 23 ST.
Louis L.J. 97, 97-98 (1979).
Nuisance may be the tort theory best adaptable in the judicial creation of an environmental tort. Comment, supra note 32, at 240. Oakes, supra note 32, discusses the evolution
of nuisance law to accomodate environmental cases. He cites the development of the federal
common law of nuisance and relaxation of the injury requirement to support his proposition
that recent nuisance cases have adapted nuisance law to conform with the needs of modern
society. Oakes contends that able and experienced judges are well qualified and the proper
parties to balance the diverse claims presented by environmental litigation. Oakes cautions,
however, that the courts must weigh the costs to all parties involved. The present equities of
an environmental case must be balanced taking into account the consequences of the court's
decision on other injured persons who have not participated in the litigation. Accord, Juergensmeyer, supra note 32, who argues that the balance must be struck between the damage resulting to the defendant and society if the activity involved is penalized and the damage to the plaintiff and society if it is not.
Wade, supra note 32, also favors further development of the common law in environmental cases. He cites the relaxation of traditional requirements of invasion constituting trespass in Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), to support his
argument in favor of common law development.
102. See, e.g., Birnbaum & Rheingold, Torts, 29 SYRAcuse L. REv. 593, 613 (1978);
Juergensmeyer, supra note 32.
103. Pedrick, supra note 99; Jackson, Environmental Quality, The Courts, & The Congress, 68 MICH. L. Rav. 1073, 1075 (1970).
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evolves.104 Such a change in society's expectations is the escalating
concern over environmental disputes. 105 In the past, society moved
more slowly than today, allowing the law a better opportunity to
stay abreast of the changes. In this century, however, the pace of
society's technical evolution has quickened while the judicial sys-

tem continues to evolve slowly. Rapid technological growth has resuited in greater potential for contamination of the population and
in actual exposure of many citizens. 106 No longer can the judiciary
justify its slowness to change by citing the infringement of the
rights of many by the few who are injured. Hazardous waste cases
pending in courts throughout the country demonstrate the need
for new and appropriate standards. The cases present compelling
demands for speedy, sweeping revision of the law. 107 But these demands will not be answered by the usual incremental changes imposed by the judiciary under the common law.
More important than the pace of legal evolution is the notion
that the changes demanded by hazardous waste cases are of the
type and magnitude courts usually leave to the legislature. Modifications of such fundamentals of tort law as proximate cause in-

volve broad policy considerations and are not often addressed by
the judiciary; the legislature is the more appropriate forum for
making policy determinations. For example, the courts do not alter
the statute of limitations period because it represents a policy decision made by the legislature.10 8
104. Law as an instrument for justice has infinite capacity for growth to meet
changing needs and mores. . . . The law should be based on current concepts of
what is right and just and the judiciary should be alert to the neverending need
for keeping its common law principles abreast of the times.
Wade, supra note 32, at 165, quoting Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 89, 90, 207 A.2d
314, 324-25 (1965). Consider, for example, the development of strict products liability that
began with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
105. See Jackson, supra note 103.
106. See DEC TECHNIcAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 2, citing the rapid growth of the
chemical industry during the 1940's through the 1960's and the current extent of pollution
resulting from chemical contamination.
107. Because environmental problems are a matter of public concern, policy considerations will play a major role in the formation of environmental tort law. Oakes, supra note
32. Oakes contends that there is a role for sound judicial decisions in the consideration of
environmental problems. Page, supra note 36, at 243, argues that the courts face a duty and
challenge in future environmental cases to respond in a "precautionary and anticipatory
manner." See also Comment, supra note 32, at 240.
108. See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142,
237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963), and Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y 287, 200

1980]

HAZARDOUS WASTE POLLUTION

Finally, judicial action will not provide the comprehensive

treatment a nationwide problem such as hazardous waste pollution
deserves.101 Jurisdiction by jurisdiction resolution of hazardous
waste cases will produce varying, possibly conflicting precedents.
Such a fragmented approach can lead to forum shopping and discriminatory treatment of all parties. The advantage of litigation's
individualized treatment becomes a liability where the goal of the
law is to compensate injured plaintiffs and to develop a uniform
policy for the proper use and disposal of hazardous substances.
Legislative action, on the other hand, can quickly resolve the
inapplicability of traditional tort law to hazardous waste pollution
cases. The legislature, as the governing body charged with determining the nation's policies, should act to meet this growing need.
Congress has acted in an analogous situation to provide a recovery
mechanism for damages resulting from the development of the nuclear industry. 110 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is congressional
recognition of the need for private development of the nuclear industry."' 1957 amendments to the Act provided for protection of
United States citizens injured by nuclear accident. 12 The Act required private nuclear developers to obtain insurance against potential claims and allowed governmental indemnification of claims
in excess of the limits of private insurance. 1 3 The Act stopped
short of creating a new cause of action for long term damage from
radiation, but provided uniformity by establishing federal jurisdiction for claims brought under the common law. 1 Failure to establish a new cause of action is not unusual given the time and purpose of the Act; it was passed at the dawn of the nuclear industry,
N.E. 824 (1936), for examples of judicial reluctance to take any action in contravention of
legislative direction. See also text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
109. See Jackson, supra note 103.
110. See The Price-Anderson Atomic Energy Damages Act, § 2010 (1976 & Supp. UI
1979). Nuclear radiation is included in Page's definition of environmental risks. Page, supra
note 36.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1976 & Supp. 11 1979), noting particularly § 2012.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2010 (1976 & Supp. M 1979). For a general discussion of the 1957
amendments, see [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1803.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. I 1979). Obtaining insurance is a prerequisite to
obtaining a license to develop nuclear power. Without a license a private developer cannot
operate. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133, 2134 (1976 & Supp. H 1979). The Act also limits maximum
industry liability so that a single accident would not bankrupt a nuclear energy producer. 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. m 1979).
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long before the latent consequences of radiation became known.
The primary purpose of the Act was not to provide a means of
restitution for persons claiming existing injuries, rather, it was enacted to protect and encourage the private development of nuclear
power. 115 Nevertheless, the Act is important as a precedent for
congressional management of a hazardous activity. The peril hazardous wastes represents to the population requires comparable action by Congress. Congress is the more appropriate forum in which
to establish a cause of action for plaintiffs who are injured by industrial development through no fault of their own. Many hazardous waste disposal sites exist across the country, creating dangerous conditions that threaten the health and property of local
residents.110 Those residents have demanded the cleanup of the
sites and compensation for the injuries they have incurred. In
1980, Congress considered a variety of funding proposals to pay for
the cleanup of disposal sites. 117 Termed "superfund" proposals,
these pieces of legislation provided for industrial and governmental
contributions to the cleanup fund. Additionally, certain superfund
bills provided a cause of action for persons injured by hazardous
wastes.118 The cause of action imposed strict liability on transport115. Prior to the passage of the Act in 1954, nuclear power was produced solely by the
federal government. Private industry was reluctant to enter the nuclear industry without
some guarantee of governmental financial assistance because of the potential for unlimited
destruction, and the resultant liability, from nuclear accidents. Congress passed the Act to
encourage private expansion of the atomic energy industry. [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3456, 3465.
116. See notes 2, 3, 12, 14-25 supra.
117. One series of bills began with the introduction of H.R. 1049 by Rep. John LaFalce
on January 18, 1979. H.R. 1049 was followed by several bills: H.R. 3797, 125 CONG. REC.
H2,458 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1979), introduced by LaFalce on April 30, 1979; H.R. 5290 and
H.R. 5291, 125 CONG. REc. H7,951 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1979), introduced by LaFalce on
September 14, 1979; H.R. 5790, 125 CONG. REc. H10,246 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1979), introduced
by LaFalce and Rep. Florio on November 2, 1979; H.R. 7020, 126 CONG. REC. H2,490 (daily
ed. Apr. 2, 1980), introduced by Florio on April 2, 1980; and S. 1480, 125 CONG. REC. S9,173
(daily ed. July 11, 1979), introduced by Sen. Culver et al. on July 11, 1979. H.R. 7020 was
eventually passed by the House of Representatives in September 1980. 126 CONG. REC.
H9,436, H9,479 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). S. 1480 was passed by the Senate in November
1980. 126 CONG. REc. S14,930, S15,009 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). The remaining bills in the
series were not considered by either the House or Senate.
118. H.R. 1049 and H.R. 5291, supra note 117, established a federal, fault-based cause
of action. Legislative intent, as expressed in the legislation itself, provided that a judicial,
rather than administrative cause of action was proposed because existing judicial systems of
deterring harm are capable of handling hazardous waste cases with modification of burden
of proof and statute of limitations requirements. No limit was placed on damages recoverable under the federal cause of action and a provision was included for the award of exem-
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ers and disposers of hazardous wastes, 119 lightened the burden of
proof and causation requirements, 20 and extended applicable statplary damages if the actionable conduct showed gross and wanton disregard for public
safety. The bills also established the Toxic Pollutant Compensation Agency (TCPA) within
the EPA. The TCPA was empowered to make limited benefit awards to injured persons
upon a modified showing of causation. See note 120 infra.
H.R. 5790 and H.R. 7020, supra note 117, imposed strict liability on persons who caused
or contributed to the release of hazardous substances into the environment. However, no
provisions were made for ameliorating statute of limitations, causation or burden of proof
requirements. Legislative intent, expressed in the legislation, states that prior to recent environmental legislation there was no effective regulation of disposal of hazardous waste.
Consequently, hazardous substances were disposed of in an unsafe manner, causing property
damage and personal injury. The strict liability provision was intended to provide a federal
system of liability without fault in hazardous waste cases so that injured persons may recover for their injuries.
Without changes in statute of limitations, causation and burden of proof requirements,
however, it is doubtful that the cause of action provided by H.R. 5790 and H.R. 7020 would
have been successful. Even in strict liability cases, the plaintiff must prove causation and
commence his action within the statute of limitations. In hazardous waste cases it is doubtful that the plaintiff can fulfill traditional requirements in these areas. See text accompanying notes 36-66 supra.
119. See H.R. 5790 and H.R. 7020, supra note 117. In H.R. REP. No. 1016, pt. 1, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 62-64 (1980), Rep. Gore advocated the imposition of strict liability in H.R.
7020, together with lessened statute of limitations and burden of proof requirements. Gore
reasoned that because only chemical companies have had the expertise and technology to
effectively control disposal of hazardous wastes, they should now bear a substantial share of
the responsibility for contamination resulting from that disposal. For a general review of
strict liability in hazardous waste cases, see 126 CONG. Ruc. H9,462 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980)
(remarks of Rep. Gore).
Compare Gore's views with those of Rep. Broyhill et al. who distinguish our tort system
from the welfare system. A tort system is intended to assign fault to parties and provide
compensation which flows directly between the parties. A welfare system provides relief
through the government to parties with no other source of relief. Broyhill contends that
H.R. 7020 merges the two systems by providing compensation through the government
while maintaining strict liability in tort. Defendants may thus be held liable two times, once
when taxed by the government to support the welfare system (i.e., the Superfund) and once
again when held strictly liable in tort. H.R. REP. No. 1016, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-69
(1980). Strict liability and retroactive applicability of statutory liability requirements were
ultimately rejected by the House of Representatives Commerce Committee "in the interest
of due process, fundamental fairness, and avoidance of protracted litigation." 126 CoNG.
REc. H9,465 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Madigan).
120. H.R. 1049, supra note 117, modified causation and proof requirements by providing for a presumption of causation upon a showing of three factors. First, a plaintiff makes a
factual showing of the physical injury he claims. Second, a plaintiff shows the "opportunity
for exposure" to a hazardous substance within the geographic scope and time span the EPA
determines necessary to cause the injury. Third, a plaintiff seeks an EPA finding of "requisite nexus" between the injury and the exposure. By introducing an administrative determination of causation, H.R. 1049 eliminated the traditional common law standards of causation proof. A defendant may rebut the presumption of causation by showing that exposure
to the alleged pollutant does not result in the injury complained of. See also note 118 supra.
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utes of limitations. 21 Congress enacted a superfund bill at the end
of the year.122 However, the cause of action provisions were deleted
from the final legislation, over the strong objections of Congressmen whose constituents have claimed injury from hazardous
23

wastes.2

CONCLUSION

Clearly, no solution to hazardous pollution problems will be
easy to implement. The financial and emotional stakes are high
and serious policy questions must be addressed. Legislators must
decide the extent to which the existing common law must be altered. The common law is, after all, the product of the careful reasoning over centuries of jurisprudence. Extensive changes in the
balance between plaintiffs' and defendants' rights must be made
carefully, recognizing the policy incorporated in those respective
rights.12 ' If the changes are made with the result that injured persons become entitled to compensation where they would have been
denied recovery under the existing law, a heavy burden would be
imposed on industry and government. Liability would be extended
to industry and government even if none existed under the common law at the time disposal occurred. In attempting to bring
S. 1480, supra note 117, as introduced provided that the defendant would be liable for
medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff if a "reasonable person" could conclude that the
injury to the plaintiff was "reasonably related" to the discharge of hazardous substances by
the defendant. The bill did not define "reasonable," but did provide a lessened burden of
proof of causation. A claimant under S. 1480 need not meet ordinary burdens of proof nor
identify the particular substance that caused his injury nor prove that any particular substance caused his injury. S. 1480 also allowed a claimant to use statistical data as evidence
to prove his case. All of these provisions were deleted from the bill as passed by the full
Senate.
121. H.R. 1049, supra note 117, provided for a two year statute of limitations after the
occurrence of physical injury as determined by the date the EPA found a requisite nexus
between the injury and the pollution. See note 120 supra. S. 1480, supra note 117, as introduced included a six year discovery statute of limitations, but the provision was deleted
from the bill as finally passed. Extending the discovery rule is essential in hazardous waste
cases because of the extended delay in discovering injuries. See text accompanying notes 5865 supra.
122. [1980] 4 Cam. REG. Ra,. (BNA) 1108.
123. See 126 CONG. Rzc. H9,466 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep. LaFalce),
"at some point in the future,. . . the Congress ...will have to come to grips with the issue
of a mechanism to give compensation to individuals who have been injured by exposure to
toxic substances."
124. See note 119 supra (comments of Rep. Madigan).
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about a just resolution of valid claims, injustice may be worked
against parties who may not have been able to anticipate or alter
the consequences of their acts.
It is inescapable, however, that hazardous waste disposal creates valid claims in tort that require compensation. 12 5 The nature
of these claims is substantially different from those known to jurists who molded the common law. The common law cannot successfully adjudicate unprovided-for circumstances without modifi-

cation. The grave and pervasive nature of hazardous waste
contamination necessitates this modification. Maintaining the existing legal principles precludes many persons from a hearing on
the merits of their claims. As long as injured persons have no recourse to recovery for their injuries, they alone bear the costs of

contamination. The cost of chemical production, transportation
and disposal, however, is not an individual burden but is the cost

of a modern industrial state and must be shared by all who benefit
from the industry.
MARY MARGARET

FABIc

125. Indeed, we are dealing with one of the most pressing public health threats of
today and the coming decade.
The severity of the hazardous waste problem is magnified even further when
one examines the inadequacy of existing authority to deal with the release of
hazardous wastes from inactive and abandoned sites. Under present authority,
before action can be taken to abate releases of hazardous wastes from such sites,
a problem must already exist, a financially responsible owner must be identified,
and abatement efforts can only begin after successful judicial action has occurred. Thus, the unfortunate victims of hazardous waste releases are further
victimized by protracted litigation.
We can afford to delay no longer the initiation of comprehensive and concerted action to abate and prevent human and environmental exposures to hazardous wastes from abandoned and inactive sites.
126 CONG. REc. H9,460 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
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